This work studies why similar market-oriented reforms in developing countries produce different growth outcomes. To answer this question, the paper combines the fact that economies have markedly different firm size distributions with the fact that firms of different size grow differently after identical market-oriented reforms. Thus, identical reforms can produce different growth outcomes based on the arguably exogenous cross-country differences in the firm-size distributions. This result is reached by exploring firm-level data on sales and sales per worker across 135 developing and post-transition economies between 2000-2010. It helps explain the remarkable variation in the vast development literature studying the effects of various market-oriented reforms across countries and over time.
Introduction
Suppose an identical market-oriented reform is adopted simultaneously across a number of countries. Will the reformers be affected identically? This paper argues they will not, and looks for the reasons behind an eventual outcome divergence. The explanation offered here, and the main hypothesis of this work, is that economic liberalization -i.e., the state's withdrawal from its legal powers to direct pricing, entry and exit on a given market (Winston, 1993) -affects firms of different size differently. Then, if two countries go through identical reforms but their firm size distributions are ex-ante different, the two economies will react differently to the reform. Naturally, the argument extends to more than two economies and to more than one liberalization reform. It also produces a variety of reform outcomes across countries and possibly over time.
Previous work has shown that, indeed, different economies may benefit differently from an identical reform. For example, Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2007) use industry-level data to demonstrate that entry liberalization affects different industries differently. More specifically, industries closer to the technology frontier would be affected more by entry liberalization and would innovate more than backward industries in order to prevent entry.
Thus, countries closer to the world technology frontier benefit more from a liberalization reform because they have a higher share of innovating industries. As a result, those countries also grow faster after a reform.
By using firm-level data and linking it with country-level reforms, I find that although firms closer to the technology frontier do innovate more, they do not do so as a result of market-oriented reforms. This finding motivates me to argue that the literature has largely ignored one of the important and at the same time intuitive determinants of reform outcome divergence across countries. In this work, I hypothesize that it is the firm size, among other factors, which drives the different impact of identical liberalization reforms on firm growth across countries. I test this hypothesis by using data on sales and sales per worker of more than 110,000 firm-level observations in 135 developing and post-transition economies, collected between 2000 and 2011.
Firm sales and sales per worker are conditioned on country data on credit market liberalization reforms, on an overall economic liberalization reform, as well as on other aggregate and firm-level observables.
The advantage of having firm-level data in this study is that reform impact is studied at a level at which it allegedly matters most for growth, and where the growth decisions are actually taken: the firm. This work finds sufficient evidence to conclude that the cross-country variation in firm size distributions before the reform takes place is one of the drivers behind growth divergence across countries after similar market-oriented reforms.
The next sections illustrate how the literature around this problem evolved, including why it could be assumed that the firm-size distribution (FSD) is exogenous to policy changes in the short run.
Literature Review

Overall Impact of Market Liberalization on Growth
Since George Stigler and his coworkers pioneered the rigorous study on the effects of various regulations in the 1960s, 1 a vast literature emerged on how product-, labor-and capital-market liberalization affect entry, exit, employment, investment and productivity, among other determinants of economic growth. The literature moved from studying specific regulations (e.g. price or quantity) within a specific industry (e.g. trucking or airlines) in the 1980s to broader studies of how regulation affects growth, growth factors or living standards across countries. Examples of the latter include Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) and Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) The work by Alesina et al. (2005) was extended by using firm-level data from both developed and developing economies, which include both small and large firms. In three studies Ardagna and Lusardi (2008 , 2009a , 2009b find that more cumbersome entry and labor regulations discourage firm entry, and that the effects are unequal across a number of individual firm characteristics.
Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) also show that entry rates by firms are significantly affected by entry regulations, and further conclude that stricter entry regulations result in larger entering firms but also slower firm growth afterwards. In effect, aggregate growth slows down because of slower firm growth.
More recently, empirical works rely on firm-level data, in which micro and small firms represent the sample majority, thereby making the results more credible. Commander and Svejnar (2011) link firm performance from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance (BEEPS) data with a wide range of institutional constraints on firm growth. Contrary to previous empirical findings, they do not support the hypothesis that institutional constraints matter for firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union, and find that country fixed effects are per-haps the main determinant of firm performance in the region. Commander and Nikoloski (2010) use more countries than Commander and Svejnar and also find that the relationship between institutions, as measured in the Doing Business Database, and firm performance, is not robust across countries.
Specifically, firms in countries belonging to different income groups are affected differently by reforms, with the reforms having the expected positive sign only in high-and upper-middle income groups.
Although Commander and Nikoloski (2010) control for firm size, they do not use firm size as a factor which, if combined with the effect of the reform, could determine differences in reform outcomes across countries. There is an emerging body of empirical evidence of differences in the responses of small and large firms to various types of liberalization reforms.
The Effect of Economic Liberalization across Firms of Different Size
Studies in various lines of empirical literature on liberalization -especially trade and financial liberalization -document a differential effect of reforms on firms of different size. The differential impact of the trade liberalization between Turkey and the EU on small and large firms is studied by Erzan and Filiztekin (1997) . Their conclusion is that small firms' value-added growth decreased after the introduction of the Customs Union (CU) with the European Union, while the impact on large firms was mostly insignificant.
The reason for different reform outcomes for small and large firms is often described in the IO literature as "compliance asymmetries." In particular, Millimet (2003) argues that smaller firms are disadvantaged in their resources to investigate and challenge legislative changes. Therefore, economic liberalization may have disproportionate effects on firms of different size. Moreover, large firms spread the fixed compliance costs attributed to a given regulation over a larger output which gives them a cost advantage.
The finance literature also analyses the difference between the effects of financial regulation on the costs of small and large firms. For example, Franks, Schaefer, and Staunton (1997) find that the ratio between the direct and indirect compliance costs of financial regulations tends to decrease with size. Consequently, larger firms are also less affected by financial regulations.
Contrary to this conclusion, Bena and Jurajda (2007) find little evidence of a differential effect of financial development across firm size, conditional on the firms reaching a certain minimum size (in their data it is 100 employees and 20 million Euro of total assets). Aghion et al. (2007) provide a strong intuition as to why identical reforms may exert a different effect across different economies. The core of their argument is that firms closer to the technology frontier would benefit from the easing of industry entry more than the backward firms because they innovate more to deter entry, and find industry-level evidence for this differential impact. In a supporting study, Bourlès, Cette, Lopez, Mairesse, and Nicoletti (2010) find that industries closer to the technology frontier would benefit more from liberalizing product market regulations, thus extending the argumentation in Aghion et al. (2007 However, in some developed countries such as Japan (Kaizoji, Iyetomi, & Ikeda, 2005) , and most notably in the developing world, this regularity in
FSDs is harder to observe, as the data presented here and additional evi-2 Following Gabaix (2009), the Zipf distribution in firm size essentially means that the probability of a firm size S being greater than x is inversely proportional to x. More formally, P (S > x) kx −α , and in the particular case of Zipf distribution, α 1. growth is more volatile (Alexander, 1949; Samuels & Smyth, 1968) . They grow faster as well but are also more likely to fail (Dunne, Roberts, & Samuelson, 1989; Jovanovic, 1982; Mansfield, 1962; Mata, 1994) . The snapshots of Second, trade theory produces a well-known proposition that different countries specialize in different industries. 5 If there is a different evolution of FSDs across industries, then the within-country industry specialization 3 For some differences in the FSDs between the developed and the developing world, see Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk (2008) . 4 The first and the last percentiles of each tail are removed. However, despite the marked cross-country differences in FSDs, and despite the documented underlying evolutionary process towards an equilibrium FSD within an industry (Hashemi, 2000 (Hashemi, , 2003 , the within-country distributions are relatively stable, as found by Cabral and Mata (2003) and Henly and Sánchez (2009). Cabral and Mata (2003) also note that the FSD of a given cohort of firms changes slowly over time, while Henly and Sánchez (2009) add that the within-industry FSD changes over long periods of time and the within-country FSD stays unchanged. Doi and Cowling (1998) (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991) . Thus, it is tempting to explain the observed cross-country differences in FSDs with different underlying institutions and property rights systems.
Finally, there are emerging implications in the FSD literature that FSDs are correlated with cross-country income differences (Alfaro et al., 2008; Gabaix, 2009 ). This evidence contributes to the understanding that FSDs are an important determinant of cross-country differences in the growth effects of reforms.
In a nutshell, both the firm-level data used here and the size distribution literature point to significant differences in FSDs across countries. However, policies seem to do little to affect the evolution of FSDs over short periods of time within a country. Rather, FSDs are more likely to be driven by withinindustry product life cycles that have more to do with fundamentals such as preferences and factor endowments that affect industry specialization than with policies. Thus, it is legitimate to assume both the FSD within a country and the cross-country differences in FSDs as given, at least in a short panel, and especially in a cross-sectional data setting. However, the variation in the FSDs also affects the cross-country income differences. Thus, it is very intuitive to hypothesize that an identical policy would have a different impact 6 See Sutton (1997 Sutton ( , 2007 for extensive discussions on FSD evolution.
across countries based on its different effect on small and large firms. The empirical strategy to test this hypothesis is presented below. First, instead of using industry-level data, this work uses data with more than 110,000 firm-level observations, which spans a richer set of industries than the manufacturing data in Aghion et al. (2007) or in Bourlès et al. (2010) . Besides manufacturing, the data set used here includes trade and other services, although it covers an admittedly lower number of countries than Aghion et al. (2007) . The main advantage of the data set here is that it is able to reveal the actual decisions about innovation and growth at the firm level.
Empirical Strategy
Confronting Previous Evidence
Second, I abstain from the definition of distance to the technological frontier in Aghion et al. (2007) , which is more relevant at the industry level.
Instead, I assume that firms have a good knowledge of the level of technology of their main competitors and of their own technology, and are able to compare them. This also assumes firms optimize based on the decisions of their nearest rival. If this reasoning is legitimate, three possibilities arise. Specifically, the firm can have a more advanced, a similar or an inferior technology to its closest rival. After classifying firms into these three broad categories, I estimate the following probit model:
where P (y i = 1|X i ) is the probability of obtaining an ISO certification or of introducing a significant innovation in the firm's product line after economic f s are time-invariant sector effects; ε i is an error term that I assume to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and the Φ function has a normal distribution so that the parameter estimates in the above equation represent the direction of the impact of being a technologically advanced or inferior firm to the probability of innovation after the reform takes place.
By applying this methodology, this work answers the following question:
Do technologically advanced firms innovate more after an economic liberalization reform? If indeed technologically advanced firms innovate more after 7 See the data description for further details on these.
a reform, then the theory by Aghion et al. (2007) would be supported by stronger firm-level evidence and by an empirical strategy that uses a direct comparison with the distance to the frontier from a firm's point of view.
However, if advanced firms do not innovate more after a reform, then perhaps an alternative explanation would be needed on why different firms react differently to economic liberalization.
The firm-level evidence in favor of the above theory is mixed at best. It is presented in Table 1 . Indeed, consistent with Aghion et al. (2007) and with Bourlès et al. (2010) , technologically advanced firms innovate more, and backward firms innovate less than firms whose technology is about the same as the technology of their main competitors. However, the interaction between the level of technology and the reform is rarely significant, and if it is, its significance is not robust across different data sets measuring economic liberalization. Therefore, there is not enough support at the firm level for the evidence that the distance to the technological frontier drives the differential impact of economic reforms across countries, and perhaps a new explanation is in order. The new explanation is based on the hypothesis that small and large firms react differently to reforms. The methods to test this hypothesis are presented below.
Estimation Strategy
To test the hypothesis that firms of different size grow differently after economic liberalization, I estimate the following baseline model for the growth of firm i in country k at time t:
where log Y ikt stands for either sales, log SAL ikt , or the sales per worker, log SP W ikt , of firm i in country k in period t. In addition, log K ikt and log L ikt are the value of total assets and the labor costs, respectively, to estimate the impact of the main factors of production; 8 CM R kt , R kt , RoL kt and T kt are the indices of credit market regulation, overall regulation, the rule of law, and international trade policies, respectively, for country k in period t, taken from EFW indices; 9 S ikt is the size of the firm measured by either the log-number of employees or by the log-value of assets; Z ikt is a vector of firm observables, including whether the firm has obtained an ISO certification, to capture some differences in the growth of firms with different levels of technology and more sophisticated management procedures, legal structure, age of the firm and top manager experience.
Further, in order to capture common but temporary shocks to firm performance within an industry or a country, the model includes industry-specific and country-specific dummies for each of the years available in the sample.
The interactions of the country dummies with the year dummies would also capture the overall reform processes happening in the country. That is why the model does not include liberalization indices as distinct explanatory variables -they are captured by the country-year dummies. Finally, ε ikt is the error term about which it is assumed, at least for now, to be distributed normally with a zero mean, and to satisfy classic linear regression assumptions.
As the reform indices vary only on the country level, firm-level variation is introduced by interacting the indices with the log-number of employees or the log-value of assets of the firm. The interaction captures how differently small and large firms grow after financial liberalization, after overall economic liberalization reforms and after strengthening the rule of law. Thus, the interaction terms CM R kt S ikt , R kt S ikt , RoL kt S ikt and T kt S ikt address the main question of this work, and α i , i ∈ [4; 7] are the parameters of primary interest. If significant, they would demonstrate that firms of different sizes react differently to reforms. If the estimates are positive, then larger firms grow more than smaller firms after a given reform.
If we take the above equation as it is, we will have to assume, at least 10 Naturally, the size S ikt is also endogenous. For the purposes of this work however, I take it as exogenous. The literature review demonstrates that the size distribution of firms is changing only slowly, and within a cross-section of data can be taken as independent from the policy changes. Then, if a given reform is enacted in some countries, it will be the initial size distribution variation that would determine the differences in the reaction of the economy, while the second-order effects of the liberalization reform, which run through the within-country changes of the size distribution, would appear only after a slow adjustment process. Then, this longer-term margin of adjustment is irrelevant in a cross-section of firms. Yet, I acknowledge the need to address the issue of endogenous firm-size adjustment by using a longer panel of firms.
"weakly exogenous." This system is as follows:
where the demand for production factors depends on present and lagged values of the exogenously determined factor prices, on the levels of the employed factors and on the output in previous periods, and on the policy determi-nants of the firm growth; the endogenous interaction terms depend on the past levels thereof, as well as on some country characteristic C kt .
The reasons for building such a system are based on theory and intuition.
First of all, basic economic intuition suggests that labor and capital demand would depend on prices. In addition, the input prices from the previous periods are included because the change in relative prices between labor and capital in the past may also influence the factor demand decisions in the current period. Further, the past values of the inputs are included as exogenous variables. It is not unreasonable to assume that if the firm overshot its labor demand in the last period, it may downsize in the current period, or if the managers of the firm had too few fixed assets in the last period, they may want to invest more this period. Also, if a firm had a good year, it may wish to expand by buying more capital and labor services the following year.
This is the intuition to include also the previous values of sales or sales per worker in the factor demand decisions.
Finally, the decisions of the government on how much to liberalize depend on how much regulation there is in the first place. For example, if a country has liberalized extensively in the past periods and now the level of the overall regulatory burden is low, it may not need to reform much further. Also, the decision on how much to liberalize depends on some purely country-specific characteristic such as the political orientation of the incumbent government, the legal origin, the history of regional conflicts, or the resource endowments.
This system has its limitations as well. Its design is intended to capture a rather short-term effect of reforms on the growth of firms, or, alternatively, use a cross-country variation in reforms to answer an inherently dynamic question. Also, some reforms take much longer to affect hiring and investment decisions. Therefore, the system may miss any reform benefits for the firm that materialize over a longer term. A much longer panel of firms may address the longer-term effect of reforms more properly. In this case, it is data limitations affecting the decision to include only one lag of reforms:
there is only one lag in the data spanning over 3 years for all firms. To capture any reform effect over the growth of firms within that period, I also estimate the above system in differences. The results are much stronger than estimating equation (2) (2) by both OLS and 2SLS, in both levels and differences. The results from estimating the model in levels are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 , and in differences -in Table 4 and Table 5 . A more detailed description of the data which feeds the model is given below.
Data
Country-level Data on Reforms
There is more than one source of country-level data on the variables used in equation (1). One of the widely used data sets is Worldwide Governance 
Firm-level Data
The The EAU data is perhaps the largest publicly available firm-level data set with relevance to the main hypothesis of this work. The results from testing it are presented below.
Results
By using industry-level data, Aghion et al. (2007) and later Bourlès et al.
(2010) reveal some reasons why product market liberalization reforms might benefit advanced economies -or those economies with a higher share of advanced firms -more than economies with a higher share of backward firms.
However, it was shown in Table 1 that firm-level evidence in support of their theory is weak. Therefore, a new hypothesis may explain why some economies benefit from liberalization reforms while others do not. I hypothesize that firms of different sizes react differently to deregulation. Thus, based on the notable differences in the size distribution of firms across countries, various economies would react differently to identical economic liberalization reforms.
To test the hypothesis, I use both OLS and 2SLS estimation of equation (2) in which the instruments for the endogenous variables are found in the rest of the system of equations. The results from these estimations are presented in Tables 2 and 3 .
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimates of equation (2) The result that small and large firms grow differently after similar reforms is much stronger in Table 4 and Table 5 . At the cost of a massive loss of observations, the estimations presented in those two tables gain insight into the growth of sales per worker and the growth of sales of firms of different size after various market-oriented reforms. The baseline equation is now estimated in differences. It tells a much more consistent story on the growth impact of various reforms across firms of different size. The messages from Table 2 still stand.
Without going into too much detail, bigger firms grow more than smaller firms after liberalizing credit markets, after improving the rule of law, and after trade liberalization. Unlike bigger firms, their smaller competitors benefit more from reforms in labor and product markets. The results are also robust to including country effects. With or without the country effects, the main result emerging from this analysis stands: The growth of firms of different size after market liberalization and property rights reforms is different.
As a result, aggregate growth would also be affected by the within-country firm size distribution. Given the cross-country differences in the FSDs, it is intuitive why some countries benefit from market-oriented reforms, while others do not.
Robustness Checks and Tests of Instruments
The results above would have causal interpretations only if the the error terms are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, and if the instruments in the 2SLS estimations are valid and strong. To ensure that some unobserved firm-level effect is not driving the growth of the firms instead of the included explanatory variables, I employ two separate procedures. First, I store the residuals from each estimation and then regress the residuals on the observed firm-level explanatory variables. In all of those estimations of the error term, I find that the included explanatory variables have no effect on the unobservable firm-level effects. These conclusions are also supported by the residual plots against the observables included.
Second, I do a RESET test. The test rejects the hypothesis that there are no omitted variables in almost all models. These omitted variables could be either the power terms of the included explanatory variables or the firm fixed effects. Re-running the model and repeating the RESET test with the squared and higher-power terms still leads to a detection of omitted variables and the magnitude of the F-test does not decrease, so the issue is not mitigated by the additional variables. Given the cross-sectional data, I
have no way of controlling for the firm-specific fixed effects that I suspect are causing the specification issue.
Therefore, I presume that the unexplained parts of the variations in sales and sales per worker are driven by either the firm fixed effects or some random factor that is not causing an omitted variable bias (OVB). Moreover, the explanatory power of most models is large enough so I expect any OVB to be relatively small. Despite the small OVB, the core message still persists across all models.
However, the OVB is not the ultimate concern with these estimations. An Table 6 and are robust to the ones presented in the main tables. I repeat the estimations with the higher number of instruments for sales and get similar conclusions.
Second, instead of using the EFW indices of reforms throughout this study, I plug the Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) overall index of financial reforms for the CMR index in the main estimations. The goal is to see if the results are robust to a certain change in the data source of reforms. The results are presented in Table 7 and are roughly robust, with minor exceptions. An important exception is that firm sales per worker the results will be consistently biased in the same direction because the same variable is missing from all models. That is why the omitted variable bias is of lesser concern here. The more important concern is how the Great Recession changes the results, if it changes them at all. The results after dropping the value of assets are presented in Table 8 and Table 9 .
It turns out the Recession changes somewhat the main results and adds an additional angle on the performance differences after a reform is enacted between small and large firms. When the estimations are done on the restricted sample before 2008, the results come out a notch stronger than the ones obtained from the full sample but not for all reforms. This means the performance differences of small and large firms after market oriented reforms were slightly more evident during the boom years before the Great Recession. With a bit of an overreach, this conclusion could serve as a guidance to further pursuits of a more general effect of crises on the impact of reforms across firms of different size. Specifically, one could expect the different effect of market oriented reforms across firms of different size to be stronger in good times, and weaker in times of recessions. This particular avenue for research, however, is left for the future. The other conclusions from this work are presented below.
Conclusion
By using firm-level data from a large number of developing and post-transition countries, it was shown that firms of different size grow differently after similar reforms. This could bring sizable aggregate implications for cross-country differences in the outcomes of many market-oriented reforms. Those differences could be determined, among other factors, by the notable variation in FSDs across countries.
In a policy context, the success of reforms depends on the share of firms with relative gains after the reform. If an economy has a larger share of smaller firms, then liberalizing product and labor markets would benefit this economy more than an economy populated by larger firms. Bigger firms seem to grow slower after those reforms. However, improving property rights, liberalizing trade and liberalizing the financial system would make an economy with a higher share of large firms grow faster than the economy populated by small firms.
The results here also partly explain why a given set of reforms might affect a number of countries differently, despite the similarity in those reforms. For example, a rich history of similar market-oriented reforms in Central and Eastern Europe has led to remarkably different reform outcomes. Offering an explanation for this and other growth divergences that occurred after a similar set of reforms could be considered the main contribution of this work to the development literature. 
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